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THE DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO A RACIAL CRITERION
IN JURY SELECTION: A STUDY IN STANDING,
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
COLLINS, a Negro, was indicted, convicted and sentenced to death for the
aggravated rape and attempted murder of a white woman. At the time of
Collins' arrest there were no Negroes on the grand jury then sitting.' Collins'
case was not presented to this grand jury, but instead he was held in jail for
six months until he could be indicted by a new grMd jury.2 This grand jury
of twelve was drawn by first picking a list of twenty names, six of whom were
Negroes intentionally selected because of their race in order to be "fair" to
Collins.3 The twelve grand jurors then drawn by lot from the list of twenty
included seven whites and five Negroes.
Collins' ultimate conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana,4
and a petition for habeas corpus was denied by the United States District Court.a
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,0 holding that
Collins had been denied equal protection of the laws. The Fifth Circuit ap-
parently relied on two theories in concluding that Collins' conviction was void.
First, a Negro defendant "stands equal before the law, ... is viewed by the law
as a person, not as a Negro," and is denied equal protection when the grand
jury is selected with regard to his race.7 Second, regardless of whether the
jury was selected with reference to the defendant's race, "an accused is entitled
to have charges against him considered by a jury in the selection of which
there has been neither inclusion nor exclusion because of race."83
Although the constitutional grounds for decision in Collins v. Walker may
have been correct, the Fifth Circuit's opinion is inadequate because the court
failed to articulate any reasons to support the constitutional theories applied
in the case. The fundamental question in Collins is why the proper remedy was
reversal of the conviction. If the selection of the grand jury had, in any way,
affected the outcome of the case - the reliability of the determination of guilt
1. This appears to have been the result of an oversight. The jury commissioners had
been instructed by the court clerk to include Negroes on the grand juries, and previous
juries seemed to have had Negro representation, but in selecting the grand jury empaneled
at the time of Collins' arrest each jury commissioner assumed that the other %%as selecting
Negroes, and took no action himself. Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100, 103 (5th Cir. 1964),
second petition for rehearing denied, 335 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
901 (1964).
2. State v. Collins, 242 Ia. 704, 717, 138 So. 2d 546, 551 (1962).
3. "I put two white man (sic) and one Negro which I figured was fair to this man."
Testimony of one of the jury commissioners, 329 F.2d at 104 n.1.
4. State v. Collins, 242 La. 704, 188 So. 2d 546, cert. denicd, 371 U.S. 843 (1962).
5. Collins v. Walker, 215 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. La. 1963).
6. 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1964), second petition for relearing denied, 335 F.2d 417
(5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964).
7. 329 F.2d at 105.
8. 335 F.2d at 419 (on second petition for rehearing), quoting Cassel v. Texas, 339
U.S. 282, 287 (1950).
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- then the issue of remedy would appear easily disposed of on traditional due
process grounds. But the Fifth Circuit never asserted that the outcome had
been affected. Absent such a statement two substantive constitutional issues
are raised: whether selection of the grand jury with reference to the accused's
race, or solely with reference to the juror's race, constitute denials of equal pro-
tection despite the fact that the jury was so selected with a benevolent purpose.
Assuming selection with regard to Collins' race was a denial of equal protection,
why was reversal the proper remedy? Even more difficult questions arise in
cases where selection only with reference to the jurors' race occurs and is found
to be a denial of equal protection to the affected juror: does the defendant have
standing to assert this denial and if so, what would be the proper remedy?
Due process clearly guarantees to all defendants the right to impartial grand
and petit juries.' If deliberate exclusion or inclusion of Negroes, or members
of any other race, in the selection of a grand or petit jury affects the outcome of
the case, the selection would deny the defendant an impartial tribunal, and
this denial would compel reversal of the conviction. The only problem in ap-
plying this analysis to Collins, or to similar jury selection cases, lies in determin-
ing whether the method for choosing the jury destroyed the reliability of the
verdict. The traditional doctrine concerning racial exclusion is embodied in
the "same-class" rule:
[I]f the defendant is a member of the race or other class excluded the
danger of prejudice is great enough so that we will condemn the exclusion
without looking for actual prejudice; but if he is not a member of the
excluded race or class the danger is not great, and before we will condemn
the exclusion as unconstitutional we must find that the defendant was
actually prejudiced.10
The difficulty with the "same-class rule," as applied to defendants who are
not of the same race as the excluded jurors, is that despite the possibility of
prejudice, the difficulty a defendant has in proving actual injury because of
partiality may render the right to an impartial tribunal meaningless. It is vir-
9. This is not to say that a grand or petit jury must be used, but that whatever tribunal
is used in the defendant's criminal process must be impartial. See, e.g., Tuiney v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927) ; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237
U.S. 309, 335 (1915) ; Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).
10. Scott, The Supreme Court's Control over State and Federal Criminal Jries, 34
IowA L. Rnv. 577, 584 (1949). The following are some examples of the "same-class" rule:
a white man cannot complain because Negroes have been excluded: Griffin v. State, 183
Ga. 775, 190 S.E.2d (1937); Commonwealth v. Wright, 79 Ky. 22 (1880); Alexander v.
State, 160 Tex. Grim. 460, 274 S.W.2d 81, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 872 (1954); State v.
Lea, 228 La. 724, 84 So. 2d 169 (1955); State v. Dierlamm, 189 La. 544, 180 So. 135
(1938); State v. Koritz, 227 N.C. 552, 43 S.E.2d 77, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 768 (1947);
Barry v. State, 305 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Crim.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 851 (1957) ; But see
Allen v. State, 110 Ga. App. 56, 137 S.E2d 711 (1964), A Negro cannot complain because
whites have been excluded: Haraway v. State, 203 Ark. 912, 159 S.W.2d 733 (1942). A
man cannot complain because women have been excluded from his jury: State v. Joneq,
44 Del. 372, 57 A.2d 109 (1947) ; State v. Taylor, 356 Mo. 1216, 205 S.W.2d 734 (1947);
Winfield v. State, 293 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Crim. 1955).
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tually impossible to use statistical data to prove prejudice. In order to do so,
a defendant would have to convince the court that he Nwas tried or indicted by
a jury which was more prone to indict or convict him than other defendants.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that statistics are not meaningful in such
cases because the existence of prejudice depends on the peculiar circumstances
of each case." Courts thus must scrutinize each individual case for the existence
of possible prejudice. But courts are equally reluctant to engage in this type of
analysis 12 since proof of actual prejudice would usually involve difficult and
sophisticated sociological and psychological inquiry.13
Herein lies the real difficulty with the same-class rule: the opportunity for
undetectable unfairness is always present when identifiable groups are arbi-
trarily excluded from or included in juries.14 The psychological and sociological
premises underlying the same-class rule are too tenuous and too subject to
the possibility of frequent exception, especially because this type of case usually
involves minority groups. The reaction of minority group members, particularly
members of persecuted groups, to their status may take many forms. A common
reaction pattern is "self hate." An individual exhibiting this pattern is charac-
terized by feelings of aggression toward his own group, caused by identification
with the values of a dominant group.' 5 Similarly, class distinctions within
11. Fay v. New York 332 U.S. 261, 280-81 (1947) ("blue-ribbon jury" challenged
by attempting to show a statistical disparity in the ratio of convictions between the two
jury systems). Cf. United States v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 79 (5th Cir.), ccri. denied, 361
U.S. 850 (1959) (suggesting that all-white juries may be prone to acquit Negroes who
have committed crimes against other Negroes); DoLLARD, CAsTE AND CLASS IN A SouTH-
ERN Towx 279-80 (3d ed. 1957).
12. E.g., in Alexander v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 460, 274 S.W2d 81, cert. dcnied, 348
U.S. 872 (1954), the defendant was a white engaged in organizing both whites and Negroes
in an unsegregated labor union in a segregated community. In rejecting his argument that
Negroes had been excluded from jury service, and hence that he had been denied due
process and equal protection, the Court tersely repeated the "same class rule": "Not being
a member of that race, appellant could not urge discrimination against members of the
Negro race." Id. at 476, 274 S.W.2d at 86. See Brief of Petitioner for a Writ of Certiorari,
Alexander v. State, .mtpra; but see Allen v. State, 110 Ga. App. 56, 137 S.E2d 711 (1964).
13. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 300 (1947) (dissenting opinion); notes 15-17
infra; see also Brief for Appellant, Rabinowitz v. United States, Dit. No. 21256 (5th Cir.,
June 15, 1964), pp. 30-34.
14. Of course, those who sit on a jury inevitably will make decisions that reflect their
personal biases or dispositions; within the system that cannot be avoided. But any prejudice
due to arbitrary or class selection is avoidable and thus intolerable.
15. Even the American Negroes share in this community of valuations: ... under
closer study, they usually reveal also that they hold something of the majority
prejudice against their own kind and its characteristics.
MYRDAs, AN AamxcAw Dr.m.nA xlviii (1944).
Because he has taken over American culture, the average Negro has also taken
over something of the white American's attitude toward the Negro .... It may also
be that some of the hostility felt toward the whites is deflected from them to the
Negro group.
Id. at 1143. See ALLPORr, THE NATURE OF PRXjUDICE 148 (Doubleday Anchor ed. 1958)
(see generally cl. 9 wherein Alport details this reaction pattern to discrimination char-
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groups, resulting from attempts by members of a subgroup to disclaim the
handicap which the group as a whole suffers, are apt to be quite sharp. Class
distinctions among Negroes are an example - the upper-class Negro often
placing the blame for his minority status upon the lower class Negro.10 More-
over, since jurors are often picked from tax lists or voting lists, the Negroes
picked for jury duty are apt to be of a higher social class than the defendant,
and a perfect setting is created for the operation of prejudice resulting from
the strong class distinctions within minority groups. These possibilities suggest
that the deliberate inclusion of Negroes on a jury, as in Collins, may well be
prejudicial.17 It seems naive to say, as did the dissent in Collins, that . . . one
of the 6 [Negroes intentionally selected for Collins' jury] held a Ph.D. degree
and ... the other five were successful businessmen or farmers - independent,
reasonably educated men. They were not mere 'Uncle Toms,' who had any
economic or physical compulsion against them, regardless of their actions as
grand jurors."'8 Race is not only a criterion independently obnoxious to the
law - as are also religion 19 and political affiliation 20 - it is also inseparably
tied up with a substantial tradition of partiality. And it is because of this likeli-
hood of prejudice that the use of racial or other arbitrary criteria in the selec-
tion of juries should lead to reversal on the ground of denial of an impartial
tribunal. 21
The problem raised by Betts v. Brady 22 and the solution adopted in Gideon
v. Wainwright 23 present a striking analogy to the issue raised by the same-
acterized by self-hate and in-group aggression) ; see also DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN
A SouTHEm TowN ch. XIV (3d ed. 1957) ; Antonorsky, Identity, Anxiety, and the Jew,
in IDENTITY AND ANxiErY 431-34 (Stein, Vidich & White, eds. 1960) (reaction of Ameri-
can Jews to the Rosenberg espionage case).
16. ALLI'ORT, op. cit. mipra note 15, at 149.
17. Another, related problem would exist if a member of a group were tried or in-
dicted for a crime which violated the group norm. For example, a Mormon who was to be
tried or indicted for a crime involving drunken driving probably would not want Mormons
on the jury. See BRoom & SELZNIcK, SOCIOLOGY 59-60 (3d ed. 1961).
18. 335 F.2d at 422.
19. Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim 297, 277 S.W. 1091 (1925) (exclusion of Roman
Catholics).
20. State v. McCarthy, 76 N.J.L. 295, 69 AtI. 1075 (Sup. Ct. 1908) (exclusion of
jurors on ground of political affiliation).
21. Of course the exclusion of certain occupational classes from jury service is quite
common and may be reasonable for the good of the community - for example, the com-
mon exemption of doctors, policemen, firemen. See Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 640
(1906). Members of the armed services, firemen, policemen, and public officers are exempt
from service in the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1958). Competing policy interests
can result in the exclusion of certain classes, as for example, the exemption from jury
service granted to day-laborers because of financial hardship may tend to exclude Negroes.
United States v. Sigler, 234 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. La. 1964). And, of course, reasonable
standards of competency tend to under-represent certain classes. Fay v. New York, 332
U.S. 261 (1947), and discussion infra at note 29. Without more evidence, the "exclusion"
in such examples cannot be said to be arbitrary or suspect.
22. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
23. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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class rule..Betts held that whether the conviction of a defendant without assist-
ance of counsel denied due process depended on whether, from an examination
of the "totality of facts" in a given case, there was "fundamental unfairness." 4
What these special circumstances were was never very clear,2- but the root
of the problem was that it was a heavy burden to require a showing of "funda-
mental unfairness" in an area in which the opportunity for undetectable unfair-
ness is so great. Hence, asking whether the defendant was prejudiced was to
ask the wrong question - a question difficult, if not impossible, to answer.20
The fact that the absence of counsel presented the opportunity for injury or
unfairness should have been the crucial point.2 7 Similarly, under the same
class rule prejudice is presumed when Negroes are excluded from a jury which
tries or indicts a Negro defendant, but in other cases, unless the defendant is
a member of the excluded class, he must prove prejudice. - Since undetectable
prejudice will so often be present when there is arbitrary jury selection, the
Gideon solution should be drawn upon, and a rule of law created to the effect
that any arbitrary exclusion from, or inclusion in, the jury denies the defendant
the impartial tribunal required by due process.29
24. 316 U.S. at 455, 462. But in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961), the
Court asserted that "when one pleads to a capital charge without benefit of counsel, we
do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted."
25. Compare Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948), wilh Townsend v. Burke, 334
U.S. 736 (1948).
26. Cf. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 ("The degree of prejudice can never
be known.").
27. Cf. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944), and the notion of "inherently
coercive" situations. As in Gideon, the presumption of injury ;as made irrebutable, and in
effect this should be true also with respect to improper jury selection.
28. As the Supreme Court declared, and akin to the rule in Bells v. Braty, the defend-
ant would have to prove this was a "special case." Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 293
(1947).
29. The effect of such a rule of law would be, in part, to make applicable to the states
the so-called "cross-section" standard of selection now applicable to the federal courts,
which requires that juries be drawn from a cross-section of the population without arbi-
trary exclusions of economic, social, racial, or other groups. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co,
328 U.S. 217 (1946) ; Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) ; see also Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85-87 (1942). This standard is based upon the Supreme Court's
assessment, in the exercise of its power of supervision over the administration of justice in
the federal courts, of proper practice rather than upon due process rights of accused. Cf.
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340. Thus, "... it becomes unnecessary to deter-
mine whether the petitioner was in any way prejudiced by the wrongful exclusion or
whether he was one of the excluded class." Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225
(1946). As this Note has suggested, inherent in the due process right to an impartial
tribunal is the notion that the broad representative character of the jury is an "assurance
of a diffused impartiality" Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (dissent-
ing opinion). Four dissenting Justices (Black, Murphy, Douglas, and Rutledge) thought
the defendant had such a right in Fay v. New York, 322 U.S. 261, 300 (1947):
We can never measure accurately the prejudice that results from the exclusion of
certain types of qualified people from a jury panel. Such prejudice is so subtle, so
intangible, that it escapes the ordinary methods of proof. It may ... erode the jury
1965]
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It might be argued that a defendant would not be affected if the state did not
select a particular jury solely with reference to him. Thus, there would be no
harm in a state attempting to ensure Negro representation throughout the jury
system by intentionally selecting a fixed number of whites and Negroes for
the general venire from which juries would then be drawn at random. The
difficulty with this argument is that jurors who have been selected according
to race either to sit on a particular jury or to be placed on a general venire
system before it becomes evident .... If the constitutional right to a jury impartially
drawn from a cross-section of the community has been violated, we should vindicate
that right even though the effect of the violation has not yet put in a tangible
appearance.
See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953):
Our duty to protect the federal constitutional rights of all does not mean we must
or should impose on states our conception of the proper sources of jury listv, so
long as the source reasonably reflects a cross-section of the population suitable in
character and intelligence for that civic duty. (Emphasis added.]
There is some indication that the pronouncement in Brovn v. Allen will apply to the states
as "something essential to fairness in trial by jury" but that in determining whether the
procedures of selection were reasonably designed to obtain a cross-section, the federal
courts would be held to higher standards than the states. United States ex rel. Sturdivant
v. New Jersey, 289 F2d 846, 848 (3d Cir. 1961); Allen v. State, 110 Ga. App. 56, 137
S.E.2d 711 (1964). But see Rowland v. State, 213 Ark. 780, 213 S.W.2d 370 (1948) (re-
fusal to extend cross-section rule). Accord, State v. Neff, 169 Kan. 116, 218 P.2d 248
(1950); State v. Taylor, 356 Mo. 1216, 205 S.W.2d 734 (1947). The question of what
constitutes a method of jury selection which meets the "cross-section" test has caused some
difficulty. See the discussion of the problem in United States v. Greenberg, 200 F. Supp.
382 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 224 F.2d 414 (3d Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956); United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 216-24
(2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 491 (1951).
The issue of whether a defendant in a state court has a constitutional right to a jury
drawn from a cross-section of the community has tended to be confused by rhetoric conl-
cerning the dangers of imposing, on the one hand, "uniform procedures upon the several
states" which would stifle "novel social and economic experiments" (Fay v. New York,
supra at 296), and on the other hand, the dangers of making the jury "the representative
of the most intelligent, the most wealthy or the most successful" which would fail to
reflect "democratic principles" (Fay v. New York, supra at 299-300, dissenting opinion).
Both the impartiality and competency of the jury are elements of due process. Obviously,
in order to obtain competent jurors some persons must be excluded, and thus some classes
must be under-represented (e.g., those without a 6th grade education). The real issue is
the relationship between the ends of impartiality and competency: does the system of
eliminations reasonably further the end of securing a competent jury at the least possible
cost of lessening the cross-section of persons who can be accepted for jury duty? In
Fay v. New York, the "blue-ribbon" jury was selected to hear cases of wide publicity
potential, and jurors were asked whether they would be influenced by newspaper reports,
etc.; the objection of the dissenters that professional workers had a greater represen-
tation on the panel was irrelevant so long as the qualifications were reasonable. Yet
certain selection procedures would clearly be unreasonable. For example, a state law re-
quiring jurors to have Ph.D. degrees to judge murder cases might secure competent jurors,
but it would eliminate too many other potential jurors who would also be competent, thus
sacrificing the advantages of a larger cross-section. A requirement that jurors be white
similarly eliminates too many jurors who would be competent, regardless of the conm-
petency of the jurors chosen.
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may well believe that they were picked because race is somehow relevant to
the process of deliberation and that each race is expected to be partisan along
racial lines.30 At the least, jurors who might be psychologically predisposed to
be racially partisan would be given a subtle impetus. Thus even this type of
racial selection should be viewed as a denial of an impartial tribunal.
But the argument that the use of racial criteria in the selection of a jury
affects the reliability of the verdict may well be too speculative to support a
finding of partiality and the accompanying due process right of reversal. A
similar problem arises when the improper jury selection is confined to the
grand jury level. For example, in Cassell v. Texas .1 the exclusion of Negroes
was confined to the grand jury, and the defendant subsequently received a
fair trial. Despite this fact, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction. Justice
Jackson, in dissent, pointed out that, unlike the situation of exclusion of Negroes
from the petit jury, reversal for exclusion from a grand jury cannot be based
upon a presumption of outcome-determinative injury. He argued that:
It hardly lies in the mouth of a defendant whom a fairly chosen trial jury
has found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, to say that this indictment is
attributable to prejudice... [I]t is frivolous to contend that any grand
jury, however constituted, could have done its duty in any way other than
to indict .... [T]his defendant has not been harmed.m
Although Justice Jackson failed to note that the Negro defendant may have
been denied an impartial tribunal because of the exclusion of Negroes, he was
nonetheless correct in asking how the remedy of reversal could be justified if
the resulting indictment was not affected by the mode of grand jury selectionPa
Indeed, the issue of the appropriate remedy must be faced in every case in which
improper conduct has occurred in the selection of a jury, but outcome-determi-
native injury cannot be shown either because the conduct occurred only at the
grand jury level or because a court is unwilling to accept an irrebutable pre-
sumption of prejudice.
Before discussing the propriety of reversing convictions in cases where the
jury has been selected on racial grounds but no effect on reliability can be shown,
it is first necessary to examine the alleged impropriety to determine whether
any legal right has been invaded, and if so the nature of that right. Whenever
a state uses racial criteria as a basis for government action in a context in
which race seems irrelevant an equal protection issue arises. The appropriate
30. Cf. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964). There the Supreme Court in-
validated the state practice of noting a candidate's race opposite his name on the ballot.
31. 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
32. Id. at 302, 304.
33. The Supreme Court however, as in Cassell, has continually reversed convictions
on the ground of exclusions from the grand jury alone. See, e.g., Pierre v. Louisiana, 305
U.S. 354, 362 (1939) ("Principles which forbid discrimination in the selection of petit
juries also govern the selection of Grand Juries:'); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584
(1958). For a discussion of Justice Jackson's view that there should be a distinction be-
tween improper grand jury and petit jury selection methods see Gibson, Racial Discrimi-
ntation on Grand Juries, 3 BAYLOR L. REv. 29 (1950).
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inquiry in Collins, therefore, was whether the method of selecting the grand
jury violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Judicial interpretation of the equal protection clause has resulted in the de-
velopment of at least two quite different doctrines.84 One is the requirement
that classifications be reasonably related to a valid legislative purpose, a require-
ment which has been used to invalidate some police power classifications;85
perhaps because of its enormous potential for judicial usurpation of the legis-
lative function, this doctrine has been sparingly used.80 The equal protection
clause, as so applied, is quite similar to the substantive application of the due
process clause 37 and requires two inquiries - the appropriateness of the classi-
fication and the validity of the purpose.8 A second doctrine under the equal
protection clause has been developed primarily in the area of racial discrimina-
tion. In this area the Court has not been so hesitant to apply the clause, and a
distinct set of criteria has been created. As Professor Bittker has pointed out,80
the "inescapable starting point" with respect to statutory classification by race
is the Supreme Court's formulation in Hirabayashi v. United States:
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their
very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon
the doctrine of equality.4"
Race has been termed "constitutionally an irrelevance" 41 and distinctions based
on it "immediately suspect.142 Even racial classifications having a reasonable
34. With respect to the equal protection clause, see generally, Tussman & tenBroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAmIr. L. REv. 341 (1949).
35. E.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) ; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
36. For instances in which the Court has refused to apply the equal protection clause,
see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545
(1954); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) ; Railway Express Agency
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Goeseart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). The most
frequent application of the clause since 1880 has been to reverse the convictions of Negro
defendants when Negroes were excluded from the jury. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Eubanks v. Louisiana,
356 U.S. 584 (1958). But the clause has found vitality also in the area of criminal proce-
dure - see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) - and with respect to malapportionment - see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962) ; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
37. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) ("if any state of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [the classification], the existence of
that state of facts ... must be assumed"); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownel, 294
U.S. 580, 583 (1935). On the different consequences between using due process or equal
protection to invalidate legislation, see Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S,
106, 111 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); BicanL, TnF LvsT DANGEROUS Bsa~cu
221-28 (1962).
38. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 34 for the distinction between these two In-
quiries.
39. Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Expcriment it Race
Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387, 1409 (1962).
.40. 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
41. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 185 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
42. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The ordinary presumption
of constitutionality would not seem to apply in cases of governmentally imposed racial dis-
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relation to a valid legislative purpose have been struck down because the Court
found the purpose also was discriminatory or disadvantaged a minority group. 3
This rigid scrutiny of racial classifications reflects the fact that "the apprehended
existence of prejudice" was a crucial reason for the adoption of the equal pro-
tection clause." Thus, it is not surprising that the Court has wielded the equal
protection clause primarily to strike down legislation in contexts of obvious
racial hostility and injury to minority groups.
This concept of injury or hostility may be sufficient to dispose of the more
usual jury selection case where Negroes are excluded from a jury either be-
cause the defendant is Negro or because of a general state policy of exclusion.
In the former situation the defendant would be denied equal protection, and
in both cases the excluded Negro jurors would suffer a denial. But a showing
of injury is more difficult in the Collins type of situation, posing as it does the
question of whether an inclusion of Negroes in order to assure fairness is a
denial of equal protection either to the defendant or to the jurors.5 Similarly,
assume the case of a white defendant where Negroes were excluded because he
was white. Although the Negroes may have been deprived of their constitu-
tional right, may the defendant argue that he has been denied equal protection
merely because he has been the subject of a racial classification?
Decisions since Brozwt v. Board of Education4 suggest that absent any
strong demonstrable state need for racial classifications, the essence of the
constitutional infirmity is the racial classification per se, regardless of concrete
injury. Recent cases prohibiting the practice of designating the race of candi-
dates for election opposite their names on the ballot 4 7 and striking dovn statutes
requiring that public records be kept on a segregated basis"4 indicate that
tinctions. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) ; Pol-
lak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 103
U. P,. L. REv. 1, 27 (1959).
43. Buchanan v. Warley 245 U.S. 60, 81-82 (1917) (against argument that racial
zoning law was designed to preserve order by preventing racial conflict, and designed also
to protect property values); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948)
(law designed as a fish conservation measure).
44. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880). See generally TENBro.EN,
THE Axr_-SLAvnY ORIIms OF THE FOURTEENTH A2MENICENT (1951).
45. A vigorous dissent in the Collins case questioned how the intentional inclusion of
Negroes on a grand jury could discriminate against a Negro accused: "if anything could
be made clearer this defendant was benefitted by the intentional inclusion of Negroes, not
discriminated against." 335 F.2d 417, 425 (1964) (Dawkins, J., dissenting).
Shortly after Collins, the United States Court of Military Appeals flatly rejected the
opinion of the Fifth Circuit and apparently approved the deliberate inclusion of a Negro
on a Court-Martial to hear a case in which the accused was a Negro:
If deliberately to include qualified persons is discrimination, it is discrimination in
favor of, not against, an accused. Equal protection of the laws is not deniaed, but as-
sured.
United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 41 (No. 3 Advance Opinions, Oct 5, 1964).
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
48. Hanm v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1964),
aff'd per curiam, 379 U.S. 19 (1964). See note 50 infra.
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"it is the stamp of classification by race that makes the classification invidious."'-
These cases imply increasing recognition by the courts that the equal protection
clause does not operate to prohibit racial classifications only when some specific
injury to a minority group can be shownr0 Although the equal protection
clause was adopted at a time when concrete and substantial injuries suffered
by the newly-freed Negroes were in the forefront of men's minds,51 it is now
- some one hundred years later - becoming clear that the fundamental evil
against which the clause is being aimed is the premise that a race is a significant
enough difference between persons to determine the way they should be
treated.52 Contemporary application of the clause should be to proscribe the
definitive element of a caste society: official emphasis upon race 63 and en-
49. Anderson v. Martin, 206 F. Supp. 700, 705 (D. La. 1962) (dissenting opinion),
rev'd, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
The per curiam decisions upsetting segregation in places of public accommodation did
not discuss the consequences for the minority group. See, e.g., City Park Improvement
Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 358 U.S. 54 (1958); Holmes
v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) ; Muir
v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953), rev'd per curiom, 347
U.S. 971 (1954). These cases are thus consistent with the view that racial classifications
are per se unconstitutional regardless of injury, but it seems obvious that implicit in such
segregation was very real injury to the minority group. Some commentators have not had
any difficulty in finding a rationale for the decisions, whereas others have been hard-
pressed. Compare Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YAE L.J. 421
(1960), with Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAUV. L.
Rnv. 1, 22 (1959).
50. The traditional view has been that racial classifications deny equal protection be-
cause they put a stamp of inferiority on a minority group. See Pollak, Racial Discrimina-
tion and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1, 28
(1959) ("[I]t is the function of Jim Crow laws to make identification as a Negro a matter
of stigma."); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YAL.E L.J, 421
(1960). Calling a white person a Negro is, after all, defamatory in some jurisdictions.
Natchez Times Publishing Co. v. Dunigan, 221 Miss. 320, 72 So. 2d 681 (1954). See also
Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964), reversing, 275 Ala. 574, 156 So. 2d 926 (1963)
(Negro has a right to be properly addressed by his full name). But the more recent cases
seem to go beyond resting the decision on that basis. In Hamm v. Va. State 13d. of Elec-
tions, 230 F. Supp. 156 (ED. Va. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 379 U.S. 19 (1964), white
plaintiffs had standing to attack the keeping of records on a segregated basis which would
be questionable if it were held that racial classifications deny equal protection only because
they put a stamp of inferiority on a minority group.
51. Note 44 supra.
52. The assertion of human equality is closely associated with the denial that differ-
ences in color or creed, birth or status, are significant or relevant to the way men
should be treated. These factors, the egalitarian asserts, are irrelevant accidents in
the face of our common humanity. To these differences in the supplicants before
her bar, Justice must be blind. Laws which classify men by color or creed or blood
accordingly, are repugnant to the demand for equality, and therefore, such traits
should not be made the basis for the classification of individuals in laws.
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CArny. L. Rav. 341, 353
(1949).
53. See DoLLAMD, CASTE A D CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TowN (3d ed. 1957); IsAAcs,
INDIA'S EX-UNTOUCHABLES (1965).
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couragement of the idea that it is a relevant"r factor in dealing with people.
Since the state must be officially indifferent to a person's race, any classifica-
tion or treatment of that person on the ground of his race, whether or not
actual injury can be shown, is a denial to him of the equal protection of the
law.
This view of the equal protection clause is analogous to the establishment
clause as interpreted in Engel v. Vitale 5 in that a substantive violation of
equal protection does not depend upon injury to a person, but rather upon
whether the state has engaged in a particular type of conduct. In Engel the
State of New York adopted a program of classroom prayers in public school;
no coercion of the children was found. In finding an establishment of religion,
Justice Black stated that:
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not
depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion
whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals
or not.58
The standard of unconstitutionality is addressed solely to the type of enact-
ment without regard to injury; if the enactment fosters a "union of govern-
ment and religion"5 7 it is unconstitutional.0 Of course, the establishment
clause rests, inter alia, "upon an awareness of the historical fact that govern-
mentally established religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand."-' 3
But in the same way the equal protection clause rests upon an awareness
of the consequences in a society which emphasizes racial differences4P Any
action which tends to break down the "wall of separation between Church
and State," or which treats persons with regard to their race without an
overriding state need for such classifications, is the "first experiment on our
liberties" 61 at which we should take alarm.(
54. The stress is on irrelevant racial distinctions. The suggestion is not that all racial
classifications are per se unconstitutional regardless of injury, but only those classifications
for which the state cannot show a strong demonstrable need, and which cannot pass
scrutiny for possible discriminatory motive or long-run harmful effect. See notes 63-66
infra and accompanying text.
55. 370 US. 421 (1962).
56. Id. at 430.
57. Id. at 431.
58. See also the test announced in School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)
("a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits re-
ligion").
59. 370 U.S. at 432.
60. See notes 44 and 53 supra.
61. 370 U.S. at 436, quoting Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assess-
ments, 2 WPXNGs OF MADISON 185-86.
62. The standing requirement has caused considerable difficulty with respect to plain-
tiffs challenging an establishment of religion because the establishment clause by its nature
can be violated without injuring or materially affecting particular persons. See discussion
in Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? - The School Prayer Cases, 1963 Surm.m
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A reply to the above argument might be that it fails to consider the benign
purpose in Collins of securing Negro representation on the grand jury. How-
ever, Professor Bittker has marshalled a compelling argument against the
constitutional validity of benign quotas in housing,03 and the reasons against
them seem even stronger in the context of a criminal trial. Racial classifications
can almost inevitably satisfy the "reasonable relation" and "valid purpose"
tests. But the equal protection clause demands more than this where race
is involved. At the very least, a strong social need, an absence of discriminatory
motive, and a lack of harmful effect over the long-run must be demonstrated.
04
These barriers would be virtually impossible to surmount with respect to jury
selection. The Supreme Court has consistently disapproved of the idea that
proportional representations of races on juries is a right of a defendant be-
cause necessary for a fair trial.6 5 The susceptibility to abuse of purportedly
benign racial classifications is particularly great in the process of jury selection,
which has been consistently infested with attempts at subtle discrimination. 0
It seems clear that there can be no demonstrable state need for racial selection,
since the state has available means for ensuring selection of a cross-section
of the community on its juries which do not utilize the criteria of race.
Having established that any method of jury selection which is based on
racial classification is a denial of equal protection either to the defendant or
to the classified members of the jury, the inquiry can be refocused on the
issue of proper remedy. Two basic approaches to the issue are possible. The
first, and more traditional analysis, concentrates on the defendant's standing
to raise the constitutional rights of third parties, and on deterrence as the
basic rationale in constructing a remedy; the second approach would employ
CT. Rnv. 1; Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 NARV. L, REv.
1265, 1309-12 (1961); Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARV. L. REV.
25 (1962).
The equal protection clause protects, like the due process clause, a "personal right"; in
contrast to the establishment clause, the standing issue and the substantive issue on the
merits are the same. Cf. Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of "Standing", 14
STAN. L. REV. 433 (1962). This Note has argued, simply, with respect to the issue on the
merits that when the state classifies someone according to his race he has been denied equal
protection; and that the classification is of such a nature that the "injury" is inherent in
the classification quite apart from the more usual "injury" one associates with racial dis-
crimination.
63. Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Re-
lations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 (1962).
64. See Pollak, supra note 50, at 26. Cf. Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d
375, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964) (sustaining school zoning plan to obtain racial bal-
ance).
65. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1950) ; Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403
(1945) ; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1880). In a case in which the ground for
reversal was admittedly arguable, the Supreme Court may have implicitly held proportional
representation unconstitutional. Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951), reversing per
curiam, 46 So. 2d 880 (1950).
66. See, e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) ; see also 1961 UNITEIl STATES
CoMIssloN ON CIvls RIGHTS REPORT (Book 5), 93-94, 99 (1961).
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a due process analysis in order to construct a more general theory concerning
the rights of criminal defendants. Although both approaches may, in the
course of analysis, ask many of the same questions, the focus, breadth, and
attitudes of each will be quite different.
The traditional analysis begins with an investigation of the defendant's
standing to raise the substantive violation of the equal protection clause. If
the jury has been selected with reference to the defendant's race, as in Collins,
standing is clearly present since the defendant, as well as the jurors, has been
denied equal protection;67 in this case the significant problem is that of
redressing the constitutional deprivation. But if the defendant can assert
only that the selection was made without reference to his own race but with
regard to the jurors' race, the denial of substantive equal protection operates
on the jurors, not the defendant. The situation which most clearly presents
the problem of the defendant's standing to raise the constitutional rights of
the jurors is that of a white defendant who challenges the exclusion or in-
clusion of Negro jurors and claims that this unconstitutional conduct should
lead to reversal of his conviction. The white defendant will be unable to show
that the action he is assailing as unconstitutional affected or injured him.
To be sure, the defendant does possess what has been called "pure standing,"'C
as does any defendant who argues that reversal of his conviction is the remedy
for the unconstitutional state action. Unless the defendant succeeds in his
argument he will be imprisoned or will suffer those other consequences which
stem from his conviction.69 But a finding of pure standing satisfies only the
minimum constitutional requisite of a "case." In addition, the Supreme Court
has fashioned other more rigorous but discretionary requirements which a
defendant must meet before he can invoke the federal judicial power. Among
these discretionary or "impure" standing concepts is that of "fits tertii"
standing - the ability of a party to raise the constitutional rights of others.
Although the Supreme Court has often denied such standing, the Court has
just as frequently granted jus tertii standing.70 Since the doctrine is flexible
and the grant of standing discretionary, the considerations underlying the
rule must be examined in order to determine whether a defendant should
be allowed to raise the constitutional rights of the jurors.' Indeed, jury se-
67. See note 62 supra.
68. See generally BIcKEL., THE L -sr Dzxaamous BRANxcH 119-25 -(1962).
69. Cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
70. See generally Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jts Tcrtlii in the Supreme
Court, 71 YA E L.J. 599 (1962).
71. A court, depending on its attitude toward the role of the courts and the exercise
of their judicial power, could view the question of ins tertii standing in several ways. (1)
The standing requirement in general serves little purpose, and may be necessary only to
insure the presence of a "case"; the requirement in many instances results only in the
avoidance of adjudication of cases that should be decided. Cf. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 266 n.30 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Doremus v. Board of Educ, 342
U.S. 429, 435 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Jaffe, supra note 62. (2) There is a pre-
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lection cases demand particularly careful scrutiny of the jus teriji claim be-
cause of the heavy price the defendant is asking society to pay for the vindi-
cation of another's constitutional rights - the reversal of a presumably
reliable conviction.
An initial inquiry in the fus tertii analysis requires a determination of the
importance of the third party's rights, which the defendant is attempting to
assert. In the case of improper jury selection, it is sufficient to say that although
any attempt to place constitutional rights within a hierarchical framework is
a most difficult if not peculiar task, the right of equal protection and the se-
curity from the evils of race discrimination it affords is a most significant one,
and at the present time, a right to which our political and judicial institutions
have given ever increasing protection.
A second consideration in evaluating the propriety of granting jits tcrti
standing is whether existing remedies are sufficient to protect the constitu-
tional right. It seems obvious, however, that the three existing remedies are
insufficient, since there is every indication that widespread unconstitutional
exclusion of Negroes from juries is prevalent. 2 An injunctive suit might be
brought by the excluded juror under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United
States Code.7s But only one suit for an injunction has ever been brought
under Section 1983,74 presumably because of the lack of initiative on the part
of private citizens to undertake such costly litigation. Federal prosecution of
election officials is available under Section 243 of Title 18.75 Yet only one
sumption against hearing such cases unless certain conditions are met. The policies under-
lying the standing requirement are so important, and the abstention from the exercise of
judicial power thus the norm, that any deviation from traditional restraint requires com-
pelling reasons. Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). (3) Jus tertl standing is dis-
cretionary, and a grant of such standing is a matter of balancing the various policies
underlying the standing requirement. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (1958); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). This third approach is the per-
spective from which this Note will analyze challenges to jury selection.
72. See 1961 UNITED STATES Co MIssxoN ON CIVIL RiGHTS REPORT (Book 5), 89-92.
73. REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
74. Brown v. Rutter, 139 F. Supp. 679 (W.D, Ky. 1956) (holding that Negro plain-
tiff was entitled to an injunction on proof of exclusion of Negroes from juries but injunc-
tion was deferred since jury officials said they intended to cease discrimination).
75. 18 Stat. 336-37 (1875), 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1958):
No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law
shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United
States, or of any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude;
and whoever, being an officer or other person charged with any duty in the selec-
tion or summoning of jurors, excludes or fails to summon any citizen for such cause,
shall be fined not more than $5,000.
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prosecution has been brought under this section (in 1878) ,7 primarily because
it would be difficult to obtain convictions in localities where racial discrimina-
tion is common, and because the Justice Department has not been able to
secure information from United States Attorneys concerning jury exclusion.7
The third remedy for improper selection procedures is challenge by defendants
asserting their own constitutional rights. An obvious reason why this remedy
has not been effective is that not enough objections have been forthcoming,
no doubt because of the rule that only Negroes can object to the exclusion
of Negroes from juries.
Since the concept of impure standing is designed, in part, to insure that
only concrete cases be heard, another factor of importance is whether the
party asserting the rights of others is capable of presenting and fully develop-
ing all the relevant issues.78 In some ways this may be an absolute require-
ment; if the facts of the case are not presented in sufficient detail, decision
on the merits will be impossible. But more commonly, the issue of concreteness
is comparative: would the party whose rights were actually denied be able
to present a more fully developed record? Insofar as incentive to develop the
issues is concerned, the defendant - raising the issue to avoid a conviction -
seems to have "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues."1
But it might be true that, at least in some cases, the defendant is not in as
good a position as the excluded or included juror to develop the facts neces-
sary to prove the alleged improper jury selection procedure. Discrimination
in jury selection is often of such subtlety that only the juror will have knowl-
edge of the facts. In many cases, however, proof of exclusion does not involve
facts which only the excluded juror could develop, but rather involves a sta-
tistical investigation which the defendant can conduct as well as anyone else.90
Moreover, this consideration - that a particular person is best able to develop
certain issues - may be overemphasized. The defendant and his lawyer, em-
ploying available investigatory resources, direct testimony by witnesses, and
modern discovery procedures should be able sufficiently to present the neces-
sary facts. If the defendant fails to prove discrimination, it is more likely that
the proof failed for reasons other than that the defendant was not as immedi-
ately affected as was the excluded juror.
76. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), upholding the constitutionality of § 243
in denying a petition for habeas corpus by a judge indicted and imprisoned for jury dis-
crimination. The original case is unreported, except for the charge to the federal grand
jury which indicted the judge. See Charge to Grand Jury - Civil Rights Act, 30 Fed. Cas.
1002 (No. 18259) (C.C.W.D. Va. 1878).
77. Op. cit. supra note 72, at 102.
78. Bicxxr, op. cit. supra note 68, at 123.
79. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
80. See, e.g, Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955) ; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935); United States ex re. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. d eid,
372 U.S. 924 (1963).
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Another relevant but difficult consideration which may bear upon the grant
of jus tertii standing is whether the relationship between the courts and rep-
resentative political institutions should preclude the exercise of judicial power
in such cases.81 The standing requirement is preeminently a doctrine which
restricts the exercise of judicial power.82 Since the Court is ultimately a
political institution, its survival may depend upon its success in avoiding fric-
tion with other political institutions. But many of the factors which usually
suggest that the Court abstain from the exercise of power because of the
danger of a "political clash" do not militate toward abstention in the jury
cases. First, the requirement of standing promotes a time lag between the
passage of legislation, when support for it is strongest, and the Court's review
at a later time, when experience and time have tempered initial judgment.83
This policy does not seem germane to jury cases involving discriminatory
practices which have been going on for years. Indeed, popular support for
these practices is probably waning, as evidenced by reforms over the last
decade in civil rights. Discriminatory selection practices often are not sanc-
tioned by state statutes but involve administrative practices by local and
often minor, political officials. The clash, if any, will not be between courts and
state legislatures but between courts and local jury commissioners.8 4 Since
increasing numbers of Negroes are obtaining the franchise in the South, it
can also be said that the possibility of conflict between a court and Southern
political institutions is slowly fading, as the base of political power shifts toward
the Negro. It is further argued that a court best avoids clashes with political
institutions by acting only when it has something unique and non-political to
offer - that is, a perspective different from that of a legislature, derived from
adjudication of concrete cases where the impact of legislation can be seen.8
But this limit on the exercise of a court's power presents little problem in
the jury cases, which involve the actual fact of discriminatory practices; the
defendant is not attacking an abstract problem before it has affected par-
ticular persons.8 6
Regardless of the considerations which may point toward recognition of
jus tertii standing, such standing cannot be granted unless reversal of the con-
viction is found to be both an appropriate remedy and an effective deterrant
to unconstitutional methods of jury selection. Indeed, whether or not the
81. Of all the considerations underlying standing, this one depends most heavily on
the court's attitude toward the judicial process. See note 71 supra.
82. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (Brandeis, J,,
concurring); Bickel, Foreward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L .R v. 40 (1961).
83. BIcKEL, op. cit. supra note 68, at 116.
84. Moreover, any conflict would not concern all fifty states but primarily those few
in the South; and, of course, there is no difficulty here concerning the relationship be-
tween the courts and Congress.
85. Bicxm , op. cit. supra note 68, at 115-16.
86. Finally, it might be noted that there is of course no question concerning the justi-
ciability of the issue. Compare Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), wvith GonIillon
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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defendant has pure standing hinges on whether reversal of the conviction is
the remedy which will in fact be granted. Unless the remedy of reversal -
as opposed, for example, to money damages to the jurors - would follow
from the assertion by the defendant of the constitutional rights of the jurors,
the outcome of the litigation will have no consequences at all for the defendant.
If reversal is not an effective deterrant, however, there is no justification for
the grant of that remedy and for tis tertii standing. Otherwise, the result
would be to allow a certain number of reliably convicted defendants to go free
without providing an effective remedy for the juror's deprivation.
There may be doubt whether a grant of standing to defendants in order to
raise the juror's rights would be effective. The efficacy of the remedy of re-
versal rests upon the assumption that the state would be forced to retry those
convicted persons who challenged the jury irregularity and that to do so it
would have to eliminate improper selection procedures. This assumption, in
turn, presupposes that challenges would be forthcoming from a significant
number of defendants. If this were not the case, the state could simply not
retry those few who challenged the selection procedures. Only if enough de-
fendants challenged selection methods would the alternative of not retrying
such defendants be foreclosed because of the threat to public safety from
letting so many guilty persons go free. It is, however, possible that not
enough challenges would be forthcoming. There are several reasons why
Negroes have been deterred from challenging jury selection, and these reasons
might also dissuade white defendants were they given standing. First,
the defendant has the burden of proof, and in order to make out a prima
facie case of discriminatory exclusion must commonly prove: that Negroes
constituted a substantial segment of the population of the jurisdiction;
that some Negroes.were qualified to serve as jurors; and that none or rela-
tively few had been called-for jury service over an extended period of time.YT
Gathering this proof can be time-consuming and expensive, and thus particu-
larly onerous for court-appointed defense attorneys.8a As methods of dis-
crimination become more sophisticated, the problems of proof can be expected
to become more difficult. Also, Southern attorneys are very reluctant to chal-
lenge discriminatory selection, a" fact notorious enough to have been the sub-
ject of judicial notice by the Fifth Circuit.89 Finally, inasmuch as objection to
the jury usually must be timely (prior to trial) a defendant would gain little
87. These elements constitute prima fade proof of systematic exclusion under the so-
called "rule of exclusion" set forth in Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). See also
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); United States ex rel. Seals v. Wintan, 263
F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 924 (1963).
88. See United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, supra note 87.
89. As Judges of a Circuit comprising six states of the deep South, we think that it
is our duty to take judicial notice that lawyers residing in many southern jurisdic-
tions rarely, almost to the point of never, raise the issue of systematic exclusion of
Negroes from juries....
United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 82 (5th Cir.), cert. denicd, 361
U.S. 850 (1959) ; see Note, 72 YALE L.J. 559 (1963).
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by challenging the selection procedures. These impediments to the assertion
of improper jury selection, however, seem to be diminishing. There is some indi-
cation that federal courts are permitting post-conviction habeas corpus review
in cases where timely objection to jury selection was not made. 0 This willing-
ness to allow collateral attack has been based, in part, on the notion that
utilization of broad pretrial discovery under the Federal Rules will present
the defendant with his first realistic opportunity to prove discriminatory se-
lection, and, in part, on findings that the defendant did not actually waive his
right to object because his attorney was reluctant to raise the issue. Under
this permissive doctrine of habeas corpus, more objections should be forth-
coming.
Even if it is assumed that reversal of convictions will deter the use of un-
constitutional selection procedures and thus redress the denial of equal pro-
tection to jurors, the issue of the propriety of this remedy must be resolved.
A problem that is always present when deterrence is thought to justify a par-
ticular remedy is that of setting some limit to the deterrence rationale. It may
well be true that reversing convictions would be an effective way to deter
improper jury selection. But reversing convictions may also be an effective
way to deter other kinds of improper state action.' For example, convictions
of all felons could be reversed until the state ceased to deny Negroes the right
to vote. Mapp v. Ohio,91 however, indicates that deterrence of unconstitutional
conduct through reversal of convictions is a proper remedy, despite the inherent
difficulties of limiting the breadth of the doctrine. Although the defendant in
Mapp, not a third party, suffered the unconstitutional deprivation, the im-
portance of the constitutional right at stake in the jury selection cases and the
grant of analogous remedies in similar jus tertii cases 92 suggest that reversal
of the conviction is an appropriate remedy. A further and decisive factor, which
should resolve all doubts concerning the propriety of the remedy and con-
cerning the desireability of granting jus tertii standing, is ihat no remedy other
than reversal has been suggested or employed to eliminate the violation of
the jurors' constitutional rights to equal protection of the law; absent the
grant of standing to the defendant and the remedy of reversal of conviction,
these rights apparently cannot be vindicafed.
The second approach to the problem of unconstitutional jury selection pro-
cedures focuses on the scope of the defendant's due process right to indict-
ment and trial by properly selected juries. In analyzing the content of the
fourteenth amendment it is essential to distinguish the two kinds of values
which the Supreme Court has recognized as inherent in the notion of due
90. See United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 263 F.2d 68-69; Goldsby v. Harpole,
supra note 89, at 83-84; Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 85
Sup. Ct. 329 (1965).
91. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
92. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Barrows v. Jack-
son, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
[Vol. 74: 919
JURY SELECTION BY RACE
process.93 Some procedural rights are obviously designed to protect the im-
portant value of "insuring the reliability of the guilt-determining process,"
reducing to a minimum the possibility that any innocent individual will be
punished. The right to counsel9a4 and the right to be tried by an impartial
tribunal 95 are examples. But other procedural rights, which the Court has
found within the meaning of due process, rest upon values other than the
prevention of outcome-determinative injury. Among the values sought to
be protected are a respect for the dignity of the individual, a desire to main-
tain the integrity of the criminal process, and an abhorrence of the misuse of
official power in the administration of criminal justice. For example, the rule
against the admission of coerced confessions cannot be explained solely upor,
the ground that they are untrustworthy.90 The broader basis for the exclu-
sionary rule, as developed in Rogers v. Richmond,7 is the policy, fundamental
to the accusatorial system and the privilege against self-incrimination, that
the accused should not be made an involuntary author of his own conviction.9 3
Similarly, Mapp v. Ohio may be explained, at least in part, as resting on this
concept of due process.99 Illegally obtained evidence is excluded from trial
not because of its lack of reliability, but because admission of such evidence
would impair the integrity of the criminal process and would tacitly condone
improper techniques of law enforcement by lending apparent judicial approval
to the unconstitutional search and seizure. As these cases suggest, in some
circumstances a defendant is entitled by procedural due process requirements
to a criminal process the crucial stages of which are not tainted by unconstitu-
tional or otherwise improper state behavior. This concept of procedural due
process makes the observance of certain standards of conduct by the state a
condition precedent to the conviction of a defendant, regardless of whether
outcome-determinative injury can be shown. Application of this concept de-
93. See generally Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedure: Another Look,
48 Nw. U.L. REv. 16 (1953) ; Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudi-
cation - A Survey and Criticism, 66 YA.m L.J. 319, 346-49 (1957) ; Packer, Two Models
of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964).
94. Gideon'v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
95. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) ; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923).
96. Wigmore argues that the exclusion of coerced confessions should rest on the un-
trustworthy nature of such evidence. 3 XVrGuoaz, EvmEcE §§ 822-26 (3d ed. 1940).
97. 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961). See also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1949).
98. The coerced confession rule, the privilege against self-incrimination, and a distaste
for unconscionable police methods are interrelated. See Allen, Due Process and State
Criminal Procedure: Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 16, 18-22 (1953); McCormick,
Some Problems and Developments it the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TExAs L. Rnv.
239-45 (1946); McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 Tnx-,s
L. REv. 447, 452-57 (1938); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 1nM .
L. Rv. 1, 27-30 (1949); 8 WIGmRoE, EvmiNcF § 2266 (MeNaughten rev. 1961). Two
recent cases, though focusing on the right to counsel, involve the same thrust as Rogers
v. Richmond in implicitly securing to the accused the privilege against self-incrimination.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
99. 367 U.S. at 659.
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pends upon three inquiries: what are the crucial stages of the criminal pro-
cess at which improper behavior will constitute a denial of due process; what
standards of conduct are required at each of these important stages of the crimi-
nal process; does it matter whether the unconstitutional or otherwise improper
behavior is directed toward the defendant or toward a third party?
Identification of the stages of the criminal process which are comprehended
by due process is admittedly difficult, and the Supreme Court cases may be
read to establish inconsistent rules. For example, Mapp v. Ohio seemingly
rested upon the proposition that searches and seizures are part of the criminal
process; Frisbie v. Collins,1 " on the other hand, explicitly denied that arrest
is a stage of the process comprehended by due process. But consistency may
be achieved if the due process rules excluding coerced confessions and illegally
seized evidence are viewed as based upon the idea that although securing con-
fessions and searching for evidence are stages of the process, they are tangential
enough that convictions following constitutional violations at those stages
need only be reversed if the fruits of the violation are later used at trial. But
regardless of the intricacies of determining the reach of due process at the
pre-arrest stage, no one has ever doubted that the grand jury, and a fortiori,
the petit jury, are crucial stages of the criminal process. The fact that the
criminal process can constitutionally be initiated by information 1 01 does not
mean that the grand jury is not an integral stage of the process at which due
process standards must be observed.
Once it is established that grand and petit juries are important points
within the criminal process, the next and most important inquiry is what
standards of conduct at the jury stage are imposed upon the state by due
process. Without attempting to catalog the standards of behavior that are
required by due process, equal protection of the lav should certainly number
among them. The search for due process limitations on state behavior might
well begin with existing constitutional prohibitions. Certainly when a proscrip-
tion of state conduct is contained in the fourteenth amendment, as is the case
with the equal protection clause, the importance of the standard is obvious,
and it does not seem difficult to conclude that such unconstitutional behavior
is inconsistent with the notion of ordered liberty. Furthermore, the equal
protection clause, as applied to jury selection, promotes values that tradi-
tionally have been felt to be at the core of due process: the dignity of the
individual defendant, the integrity of the criminal process, and the premises
of a democratic society. To select a jury with regard to the race of the de-
fendant or to the race of other jurors is to confirm publicly the basic tenet
of a caste system - that race is a relevant criterion in dealing with people;
and it is intrinsic to a caste society that it systematically deprives its lower
orders of the attributes of human dignity.102 Moreover, to exclude jurors for
100. 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952).
101. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
102. See note 53 supra.
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racial reasons demeans the criminal process as a source of law and justice;
such conduct is not only lawless in its own right, but may lead to a lack of
public confidence in the administration of criminal justice, at least among
Negroes, and to an attitude of being above the law among whites. 103 Finally,
such racial selection conflicts with the central role of the jury in a democratic
society. The long tradition of basing eligibility for jury service on eligibility
to vote 'o4 indicates the close connection which Anglo-American democracy
has seen between political and legal participation. At the same time, it has
always been deemed one of the most fundamental rights of a criminal de-
fendant that he be judged only by his peers. Both of these beliefs support
the principle - long recognized in the federal courts - that prospective
jurors should be selected from the broadest possible base in the community.103
Thus, with respect to jury selection, it seems clear that equal protection and
due process point to the same fundamental values and that it is particularly
appropriate to include equal protection among the limitations imposed by
the due process clause upon the kinds of criminal procedures that will support
a conviction.1 6
103. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example ... . If the government becomes a law-
breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto him-
self; it invites anarchy.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
104. This is a common state requirement - e.g., CoNx. GEr. STAT. AnN. tit. 51,
§ 51-217 (Supp. 1964); Mrcn. STAT. ANN. § 27.824(5) (Supp. 1963) - but not a federal
requirement. Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1957, persons incompetent to serve on juries
according to state law were also incompetent to serve on federal juries. 62 Stat. 951 (1948).
The 1957 Act set qualifications for federal jurors independent of state law. 71 Stat. 638
(1957), 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1958). The purpose was to eliminate indirect racial discrimi-
nation in federal courts as, for example, in Mississippi where jurors must be voters but
Negroes are not allowed to vote. See 103 CoNG. RFxc 13154 (1957) (remarks of Sen.
Church).
105. See note 29 supra.
106. If the conviction is itself the substantive deprivation which constitutes the denial
of equal protection there is no need to invoke due process. For e.xmmple, if a state could
be proved to have a policy of convicting only Negroes for a particular offense, such con-
victions would themselves be the denial of equal protection and hence void. Nor is there
need to invoke due process if the resulting conviction was caused by or was a product of
the denial of equal protection. Cf. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (reversal of
contempt conviction of a Negro for refusing to sit in "Negro section" of courtroom);
Hamilton v. Alabama, 275 Ala. 574, 156 So. 2d 926 (1963), rev'd, 376 U.S. 650 (1964);
Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963). See also Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880) ; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) ; Avery v. Georgia,
345 U.S. 559 (1953) (reversal of Negro defendants' conviction on equal protection grounds
when Negroes excluded from petit jury). But in other cases such as Collins v. Wal:er
in which the procedure involved was neither intended nor likely to cause a discriminatory
outcome, the conviction itself would not deny equal protection. In such cases the connection
between the substantive denial of equal protection and the conviction which followed is
established through due process, which holds that selection of the grand and petit jury is
a crucial stage of the criminal process at which stage due process standards - among them,
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A final issue arises when the jurors, but not the defendant, have been denied
equal protection. Does this conduct, standing alone, violate the defendant's
right to due process, requiring reversal of the conviction? It is clear that the
unconstitutional state conduct took place at a crucial stage of the criminal
process during which due process standards must be observed as a condition
precedent to a conviction. In addition, whether the jury is selected with refer-
ence to the defendant's race or to the race of the jurors, the state by affirming
the tenets of a caste society has failed to respect the dignity of the individual
at an important stage of the process. The harm to the integrity of the criminal
process is the same in either case. A fundamental basis for requiring the ob-
servance of certain standards as a condition precedent to a conviction is that
because "power is always subject to abuse, sometimes subtle, other times, as
in the criminal process, open and ugly,"107 the state itself is on trial whenever
it invokes the criminal process. This open abuse of power by the state in the
course of obtaining a conviction should be considered a failure to afford the
defendant due process, regardless of whom the unconstitutional state conduct
may have affected in the first instance.108 Reversal of criminal convictions
which have been tainted by such state action is required not so much as a
deterrent to those who disregard fundamental values, but as "an affirmation
of proper values."'109
The most obvious difference between the jus tertii and due process analyses
is that in some cases application of the respective theories may produce
different results.110 But this distinction, drawn on an empirical level, is just
one reflection of more significant differences between the theories. TJse of
the jus tertii analysis does not facilitate generalization from one case to an-
other; the analysis does not readily lead to creation of a single theory appli-
cable to all criminal cases. A due process theory, on the other hand, offers a
general framework of analysis which applies throughout the criminal system;
its use may allow rationalization of seemingly diverse and unrelated prece-
dents, including Mapp v. Ohio, Cassel v. Texas,"1 and Rogers v. Richmond,
by focusing on whether the state has observed certain conditions precedent to
equal protection - must be observed. Equal protection in the process is a condition prece-
dent to a conviction, but it is due process which voids a conviction secured in the absence
of all the applicable conditions precedent.
107. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 16 (1964).
108. The same analysis would hold that a defendant has a due process right to a re-
versal when evidence illegally seized from someone other than the defendant is introduced
at his trial. At the present time, if the accused was not the victim of the illegal search or
seizure he has no standing to suppress the evidence. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S,
471, 491-92 (1963) ; Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121 (1942) (dictum), He
must ordinarily show a possessory interest in the property or presence at the time of the
search. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). The same result has been advocated
under a jus tertii analysis. See Sedler, supra note 70, at 656-58.
109. Packer, supra note 107, at 55. See note 103 supra.
110. See note 112 infra.
111. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
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a valid conviction. A more fundamental difference between the theories is
their difference in emphasis. Jus tertii asks questions such as whether the record
is concrete, whether adjudication will cause a clash between the court and
other political institutions, and whether no other effective means exists to
remedy the unconstitutional state conduct. Although notions of deterrence
may not be wholly lacking in the due process theory, the most important
issues are what stages of the criminal system are central to the process and
what standards of conduct must be observed at each stage."- Underlying all
of these distinctions is, of course, a fundamental difference in attitude tovard
constitutional adjudication. The jus tertii analysis, as a part of the standing
doctrine, is primarily concerned with the propriety and desirability of exer-
cising the judicial power. Due process involves close judicial scrutiny of the
procedures used by the state in administering criminal justice and seeks to
maintain values perceived as integral to our society. This basic conflict may
be capsulized by the trite and frequently pejoritive terms "judicial restraint"
and "judicial activism." And ultimately it is this difference in the conception of
the judicial process which will determine a court's choice between the ius
tertii and the due process approach.
112. This conception of due process would be reflected in dealing with another prob-
lem in the search and seizure cases: if illegally seized evidence is introduced at a trial
(whether or not seized from the defendant, see note 103 supra), should the conviction be
reversed if there is enough other evidence to support the conviction? In other words, can
the erroneous admission of evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure be subject
to the rules of "harmless error"? If all that were involved was a deterrence rationale one
might be pragmatic and conclude that no deterrent function would be served, and that to
reverse would only result in a "needless retrial." See Faby v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85,
92 (1963) (dissenting opinion); People v. Parham, 384 P.2d 1001, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497
(1963); Note, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 367 (1964). But if what is at stake is that conditions
precedent to a conviction have not been met, the conviction cannot stand. A conviction is
an affirmation of the observance of due process values and cannot stand if they have not
been observed; the retrial is more than "needless."
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